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COMMENT




It has been said that virtue consists essentially in "a mean
between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which
depends on defect..."1 In Miranda v. Arizona,2 the Supreme
Court redressed perceived constitutional defects inherent in
then-contemporary police interrogation procedures by fashioning
a general exclusionary rule.3 Linked conceptually to this rule is
* J.D., June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., March 2001, University of
Chicago.
1 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1747-48
(Jonathan Barnes ed., Ross Urmson trans., Princeton University Press 1984).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See id. at 478-79 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of [a custodial]
interrogation can be used against [the defendant]."); see also Winsett v. Washington, 860
F. Supp. 479, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that privilege against self-incrimination applies
in any situation where individual feels compelled to testify against himself), aff'd, 130
F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1997); James T. Pisciotta, Comment, Miranda Survives To Be Heard:
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the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as explicated by the
Court in Wong Sun v. United States,4 which prohibits the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution or derivative
evidence acquired through tainted primary evidence. 5 The
parallel development of these two doctrines 6 had, however, left
unsettled the application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to derivative evidence acquired from an unwarned
statement. 7 This landscape became yet more convoluted by the
Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States,8 which confirmed
that the protections afforded by Miranda were constitutional
rights and not merely prophylactic rules. 9 As a consequence,
disagreement emerged in various circuits regarding the
admissibility of physical evidence that is derivative of statements
Dickerson v. United States, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 673, 673-75 (2001) (detailing Court's
creation of new evidence rule that prosecution must demonstrate use of procedural
safeguards in protecting privilege from self-incrimination).
4 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
5 See id. at 488 (clarifying doctrinal question as "whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint") (quoting Maguire, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 221 (1959)); see also
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (stating that fruits of noncoercive Miranda
violations do not violate Fifth Amendment rights when warnings have occurred and
derived evidence is accused party's voluntary testimony); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 450-52 (1974) (admitting testimony of witness as evidence of unconstitutional police
action).
6 See Elstad, 470 U.S at 306 (explaining that Miranda violations differ from Fourth
Amendment violations because Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule deters unreasonable
searches on much broader scale); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659-60
(1984) (excluding subsequent statements following Miranda violation as illegal fruits);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445 (allowing evidence derived from Miranda violation into evidence
since warning was made prior to voluntary statements); United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d
1135, 1143 (4th Cir. 1997) (announcing that whether statements were to be suppressed as
tainted fruit turned on whether they were voluntarily made since Miranda violations are
not subject to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine); Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d
269, 279 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to suppress testimony as fruit of Miranda violation).
7 See Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(reflecting on Court's denial of certiorari, despite fact that state and federal courts have
been divided on question of whether physical evidence obtained as result of Miranda
violations should be admissible); see also Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280, 280
(1978) (dividing evenly on question of admissibility and affirming lower court); Kerry F.
Schonwald, Eating the Poisonous Fruit: The Eighth Circuit Will Not Exclude Derivative
Evidence From a Miranda Violation, 69 MO. L. REV. 1183, 1193-96 (2004) (discussing
circuit court split as to whether derived evidence can be admitted in unwarned
situations).
8 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
9 See id. at 444 (summarizing that Miranda rule is constitutional and cannot be
superseded by Congress); see also Yale Kamisar, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of
Confession Law: Foreword: From Miranda To § 3501 To Dickerson To..., 99 MICH. L.
REV. 879, 888 (2001) (commenting on how Court dismissed its own previous view of
Miranda in finding it to be constitutional); Pisciotta, supra note 3, at 684-86 (discussing
Court holding that Miranda was constitutional despite existing exceptions).
MIRANDA'S EXCESSES
obtained from unwarned statements.1 0  The nadir of this
dissension was exemplified in United States v. Patane,Zl in which
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to exclude physical evidence derived
from statements acquired in violation of the defendant's Miranda
rights. 12 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not exclude physical
evidence derived from statements acquired from an unwarned
statement, thereby reversing the holding and rationale of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 13
In Patane, the defendant was indicted for the crime of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.14 However, as the
Court of Appeals noted, the story properly begins with the
defendant's prior arrest for harassing and menacing his ex-
girlfriend.15 He was released from custody on June 3, 2001,
subject to a restraining order that prohibited him from contacting
his ex-girlfriend in the ensuing seventy-two hours.16 Three days
later, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms informed the
local police that the defendant was a convicted felon who
10 See United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2003)
(reversing lower court's suppression of physical evidence and partial suppression of post-
warning statement); United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2002)
(reversing grant of suppression motion on physical evidence); United States v. Sterling,
283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (permitting gun found from unwarned police action to be
submitted into evidence); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding "fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine inapplicable to evidence derived from unwarned
statement and allowing admission of gun).
11 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
12 See id. at 1029 (indicating that fulfillment of Miranda's deterrent purpose would
not be achieved unless physical fruits of violation were suppressed along with statement);
see also Abraham v. Kansas, 67 Fed. Appx. 529, 534 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that circuit
court's decision was controlling in regards to derived physical fruit, but that it would not
be impacted by subsequent Supreme Court decision); Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1018
(declining to follow circuit court's extension of "fruits" doctrine).
13 See United States v. Patane, 124 5. Ct. 2620, 2630 (2004) (reiterating that
statements taken with improper Miranda warnings are presumed coerced only for certain
purposes and then only to protect against self-incrimination); see also United States v.
Ross, 113 Fed. Appx. 884, 884-85 (10th Cir. 2004) (referencing Patane in concluding that
failure to follow Miranda procedures did not taint fruit derived from unwarned voluntary
statements); United States v. Renken, No. 02 CR 1099, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21707, at
*16-17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2004) (following Patane in rejecting defendant's argument that
evidence derived from unwarned statements should be suppressed).
14 See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1014 (discussing how arrest occurred from results of two
separate investigations).
15 See id. (indicating release from arrest for harassing and menacing ex-girlfriend
was subject to temporary restraining order).
16 See id. at 1014-15 (revealing that communication prohibitions included in person
or by phone, directly or indirectly).
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possessed a .40 caliber Glock firearm. 17 At about the same time,
the police responded to a call from the defendant's ex-girlfriend
concerning a purported violation of the restraining order.18 After
arresting and handcuffing the defendant, the police began to
advise him of his Miranda rights.19 However, before the police
concluded, the defendant stated that he knew his rights and no
further Miranda Warnings were given. 20 The police then
inquired as to whether the defendant possessed any firearms, to
which the defendant replied, "[t]he Glock is in my bedroom on a
shelf, on the wooden shelf."21 The police then entered the
defendant's home, found the firearm in the indicated location,
and seized it.22 At the subsequent suppression hearing, the
district court suppressed the firearm based on its determination
that the police did not have probable cause to arrest the
defendant. 23 The Government appealed this order,24 and the
Court of Appeals, while finding that probable cause existed to
arrest the defendant,25 affirmed the district court's order because
the evidence was discovered as a result of the defendant's
unwarned statements. 26 The Government then sought, and was
granted, a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court.27
Relying on Dickerson, the Tenth Circuit ruled that physical
evidence derived from a defendant's unwarned statements is
inadmissible. 28 The Patane court found that the sparingly few
17 See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that
record did not reveal how probation officer knew that gun existed), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 2620
(2004).
18 See id. (discussing how ex-girlfriend was afraid for her safety because she knew
Patane was in possession of gun and list of people he wanted to kill).
19 Id. at 1015 (stating that detective got no further than right to remain silent).
20 Id. (noting that government conceded that this was Miranda violation).
21 Id.
22 Id. (noting that officer received permission from defendant to retrieve gun).
23 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1014 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing
insufficiency of evidence leading up to arrest), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
24 Id. at 1014-16 (noting government's argument that defendant did not violate his
restraining order).
25 Id. at 1018 (holding that there was sufficient evidence that defendant violated
domestic violence restraining order).
26 Id. at 1029 (holding that "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine may apply to
physical fruits of Miranda violation).
27 United States v. Patane, 538 U.S. 976 (2003) (granting certiorari).
28 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1029 (holding that physical fruits of Miranda violation must be
suppressed).
2005] MIRANDAS EXCESSES
pre-Dickerson decisions 29 dealing with this issue were no longer
controlling. 30 The court maintained that although Oregon v.
Elstad,31 Michigan v. Tucker,32 and New York v. Quarles33
declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine within
the Miranda context, 34 the rationale motivating those decisions
was no longer compelling given the Dickerson holding. 35 In so
doing, the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the post-Dickerson
holdings of the Third and Fourth Circuits, 36 and dramatically
extended the post-Dickerson holding of the First Circuit. 37 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the Tenth
Circuit and, in so doing, ruled that Miranda is a "prophylactic
constitutional rule" that does not mandate the suppression of
physical evidence derived from its violation.38
29 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665-72 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that willful Miranda violation should have
broader exclusionary application); see also United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1117
(10th Cir. 1994) (noting that Elstad established that failure to provide Miranda warnings
alone does not compel suppression of "fruits" of the statement). But see Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (stating that Supreme Court has been zealous to protect
privilege against self incrimination).
30 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 2002) (reviewing effects
of Dickerson holding on circuit courts), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
31 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
32 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
33 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
34 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that those
cases were decided on now-overruled idea that Miranda rule was prophylactic in nature),
rev'd 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
35 Id. (stating that Dickerson fundamentally changed earlier premise); see Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (concluding that Miranda announced
constitutional rule that may not be superseded legislatively); see also Abraham v. State,
211 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1322-23 (D. Kan. 2002) (acknowledging that Dickerson holding
altered 'prophylactic' rule).
36 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1027 (declining to adopt position that "fruits" doctrine can
never apply to Miranda violations); see United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-19
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding that physical fruits of Miranda violation should never be
suppressed; United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to derivative physical evidence); see
also United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1017 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
Patane rejected method followed by Third and Fourth Circuits).
37 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1029 (declining to adopt Faulkingham's view that physical
fruits of negligent Miranda violations are admissible); see United States v. Faulkingham,
295 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing court's unwillingness to say that derivative
evidence may never be suppressed); see also United States v. Gilmore, 03-CR-0030-C-01,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4912, at *14-20 (D. Wis. March 16, 2004) (discussing extension
from inadmissibility based on intentional violations to inadmissibility regardless of
intent).
38 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) ("The Self-Incrimination
Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a
voluntary statement. Accordingly, there is no justification for extending the Miranda rule
to this context.")
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This Comment will argue, as the Supreme Court held, that the
Tenth Circuit erred by applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine so as to exclude physical evidence derived from a
negligent Miranda violation. It is further asserted that the
application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine within the
context of intentional Miranda violations, as was the case in
United States v. Faulkingham,39  is also without merit.
Consequently, this Comment maintains that the decision of the
Supreme Court, that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
should not exclude physical evidence derived from a negligent
Miranda violation, is correct but should be extended to
encompass intentional as well as negligent Miranda violations.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIRANDA AND THE "FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE" DOCTRINE
In Miranda the Court provided for more effective protections of
a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to have
compelled statements used against him at trial40 than were
previously available. The Court held that statements made by a
defendant in the course of a custodial interrogation were
generally inadmissible against him in the prosecution's case-in-
chief unless the defendant was provided with appropriate
warnings and executed a voluntary and knowing waiver of
rights.41 However, the exclusionary rule developed in Miranda is
not absolute;42 the Court has created exceptions that do not bar
39 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002).
40 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (stating that necessary warnings
include: right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in a court of law,
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if you cannot afford attorney, one will be
appointed for you prior to any questioning); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (stating
that Miranda warnings have "become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985) (noting that prior to Miranda, admissibility revolved around
voluntariness, but statements which were voluntary could nonetheless be coerced).
41 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (stating that these "procedural safeguards" are
necessary to protect accused's right against self incrimination); see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
440 (asserting that "the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored"). See generally Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 (1971) (allowing statements not admissible under
Miranda to be admitted on prosecution's case in chief to attack accused's credibility).
42 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 (clarifying that decisions after Miranda which sculpted
exceptions to rules articulated in that case stand only for proposition that "no
constitutional rule is immutable"); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975)
(noting that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to attack accused's
credibility because court cannot knowingly allow perjury that would pervert
2005] MIRANDA'S EXCESSES
the use of evidence acquired from an unwarned statement. 43
Analogous to this exclusionary rule is the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine,44 which suppresses evidence that is the "fruit" of a
search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 45
A. The Development of Miranda and Fifth Amendment
Jurisprudence
The Miranda Court determined that custodial surroundings
and then-contemporary interrogation procedures obscured the
distinctions between voluntary and involuntary statements and
thereby between genuine and fabricated statements.46 A survey
of then-contemporary police practices indicated that more
effectual protections were necessary to preserve a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights.47 Before the Miranda decision, the
admissibility of custodial confessions turned on whether the
administration of justice); Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-226 (holding that statements not
admissible on prosecution's case in chief due to Miranda may be used to attack accused's
credibility).
43 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (stating that "[a] subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier
statement"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (finding that public safety
concerns may trump necessity of giving Miranda warning in certain situations). See
generally Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (noting that when police
conduct occurred before Miranda decision, the conduct "did not abridge [defendant's]
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by th[e] Court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege").
44 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963) (discussing exclusionary
rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine); see United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405,
409-10 (1st Cir. 1998) (comparing exclusionary rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine); see also Winsett v. Washington, 860 F. Supp. 479, 482-83 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(noting similarities between Fourth Amendment and Miranda exclusionary rules), aff'd,
130 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1997).
45 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (holding that there is no appreciable difference between
tangible and verbal evidence and thus both may be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous
tree"); see Winsett, 860 F. Supp. at 482-83 (discussing Fourth Amendment and Miranda
exclusionary rules). See generally Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450-57 (discussing relationship
between Miranda and "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine).
46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (noting difficulty in determining
voluntariness when situations like these exist); see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434-35 (noting
risk that coercive police tactics will elicit involuntary statements). See generally Quarles,
467 U.S. at 654 (asserting that "[t]he Miranda Court ... presumed that interrogation in
certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive").
47 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58 (summarizing and surveying landscape of
interrogation procedures used to illicit confessions from accused). See Dickerson, 530 U.S.
at 433-37 (reiterating circumstances that led Court to lay down constitutional guidelines
to govern admissibility of confessions obtained by police). See generally Chambers v.
Florida 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940) (noting that coercion can be accomplished through either
mental or physical means).
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confession was voluntary and whether a defendant's will was
overcome. 48 Dissatisfaction with the pre-Mira,'da voluntariness
standard prompted the Court to fashion the exclusionary rule,49
which provided that courts must not admit custodial confessions
obtained from a defendant without the benefits of appropriate
warnings and without a voluntary and knowing waiver of
rights. 50
B. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule in Miranda
The constitutional imperatives of the Fifth Amendment led the
Court to generally prohibit the admission of evidence realized
from an unwarned statement. 51  Yet the Court did not
contemplate the exclusion of all such evidence. Indeed, in Harris
v. New York52 and in Oregon v. Hass,53 statements obtained in
violation of Miranda were held to be admissible so as to impeach
the defendant's testimony.54 The Court noted that the deficiency
of Miranda warnings did not so corrupt the statement's worth,
48 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432-36 (discussing development of law governing
admissibility of suspect confessions and voluntariness test); see Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that "a confession, in order to be admissible, must be
free and voluntary"); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964) (reiterating test
announced in Bram v. United States, which governed admissibility of confessions).
49 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (stating holding of Miranda). See generally
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432-36 (discussing history and problems with voluntariness
standard pre-Miranda); Bram, 168 U.S. at 534 (providing survey of law governing
admissibility of confessions before Miranda decision).
50 Miranda, 384 U.S at 478-79 (summarizing that privilege against self-
incrimination must be "scrupulously honored"); see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434-35 (noting
that guidelines laid down in Miranda were to guide both courts and law enforcement
officers). See generally New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (noting that
Miranda warnings insure that right against self-incrimination is protected).
51 See Miranda, 384 U.S at 479 ("[T]he Constitution has prescribed the rights of the
individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth
Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That
right cannot be abridged."); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (stating
that Miranda warnings are designed to protect constitutional right against self-
incrimination). See generally Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (noting that
constitutional imperatives do not require use of voluntary statements obtained in
violation of Miranda to be used to attack accused's credibility).
52 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
53 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
54 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-24 (noting that though Miranda bars use of accused's
statements in case in chief, these statements may be used to attack accused's credibility);
Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 (finding that statements that are inadmissible on prosecution's
case in chief may nonetheless be admissible to impeach the accused if they are otherwise
trustworthy); see also Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the
Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 302
(1996) (noting how courts have allowed statements taken in violation of Miranda to
impeach witnesses credibility).
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for impeachment purposes, so long as that statement was not
coerced or otherwise involuntary. 55
In New York v. Quarles,56 the Court held that unwarned
statements and evidence derived from those statements are
admissible when public safety would be imminently endangered
by any delay in acquiring the evidence. 57 The Court indicated
that an unwarned statement concerning the location of a firearm,
and the firearm itself, were admissible because the defendant
had discarded the gun in a crowded supermarket. 58 Thus, when
"the need for answers to questions... outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule [of Miranda]," both primary and derivative
evidence are admissible. 59
In Michigan v. Tucker,60 the defendant was provided with only
the warnings that were necessary prior to the Miranda
decision, 61 which did not include the right to free counsel. 62 After
executing a waiver of rights,63 the defendant identified a
potential alibi witness.64 However, this witness contradicted the
asserted defense, 65 and this evidence was used by the prosecution
55 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-24 (noting that statements used for impeachment,
though obtained in violation of Miranda, were not "involuntary or coerced"); Harris, 401
U.S. at 224 (holding that statements used to impeach must still otherwise meet
evidentiary standards for trustworthiness); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 452 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing cases that allowed statements taken in
violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment purposes).
56 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
57 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651 (holding that this result was compelled by "overriding
considerations of public safety").
58 Id. at 657 (stating that failure to give Miranda warnings was excused by risk to
public safety).
59 Id.
60 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
61 Id. at 447-48 (stating that right to counsel warning was not provided); see Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966) (holding that Miranda "should not be applied
retroactively"); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (deciding right to
counsel is violated only if police are conducting inquiries into specific suspects, not
conducting general investigations).
62 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436 (stating police advised defendant of his right to remain
silent); see Michael R. Hartman, Note, A Critique of United States v. Bin Laden in Light
of Chavez v. Martinez and the International War on Terror, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
269, 272 (2004) (stating there was no requirement that police warn defendants of their
rights prior to Miranda); see also Susan L. Ross, Comment, Davis v. United States: The
Ambiguous Request for Counsel, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 941, 943-44 (1996) (noting that
Miranda stressed "the right to have an attorney present during interrogation").
63 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436 (stating that defendant did not desire legal counsel).
64 Id. at 436-37 (noting that police contacted defendant's potential alibi witness).
65 Id. at 436-37 (1974) (indicating that defendant's story was discredited rather than
bolstered by witness' statement).
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in its case-in-chief.66 The Court expressly declined to apply the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine so as to suppress the
derivative witness testimony uncovered through an unwarned
statement. 67 "This Court has also said, in [Wong Sun], that the
'fruits' of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed... [but] in
deciding whether [defendant's] testimony must be excluded,
there is no controlling precedent of this Court to guide us." 68
In Oregon v. Elstad,69 the defendant made a statement while
in custody but prior to receiving Miranda warnings. 70
Subsequently, the defendant was given Miranda warnings and
made yet another statement. 71 The Court held that the warned
statements need not be suppressed because of the initial
Miranda violation.72 In so doing, the application of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine in such an instance was rejected 73
for as the Court indicated, "the dictates of Miranda and the goals
of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use of compelled
testimony are fully satisfied... by barring use of the unwarned
statement in the case in chief."74 Thus, as in Tucker, the Court
declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the
context of a Miranda violation. 75
66 Id. at 437 (stating that testimony by defendant's alibi witness was admitted).
67 Id. at 446-52 (stating that public policy would not be served by excluding
testimony of defendant's alibi witness).
68 Id. at 445-46.
69 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
70 Id. at 301 (stating defendant was interrogated at home before taken into custody).
71 Id. (noting that defendant continued to waive his rights).
72 Id. at 317-18 (holding that courts cannot presume coercion when Miranda is
violated if statement was otherwise voluntary). See generally Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (deciding that prosecutors have sufficient opportunity to prove
that possibly tainted evidence was independently gathered).
73 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305-06 (noting difference between procedural Miranda
violation and Fourth Amendment violations for purposes of exclusion); see also V.
Lakshmi Arimilli, Confessions and the Tennessee Constitution, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 637,
652-53 (1994) (explaining that Elstad, in rejecting defendant's "fruit of the poisonous
tree" argument, noted that "Miranda rights substantially differ from those rights
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments"). See generally Clifford S. Fishman,
Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo and the Questions
Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 350 (1985) (noting that courts have rejected
notions that all evidence discovered by police misconduct can be excluded under "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine).
74 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
75 See id. at 317-18 (1985) (holding that "a suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and
confessing after he has been given the requisite warnings"); see also Michigan v. Tucker,
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C. Development of the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"Doctrine
The Court in Wong Sun v. United States76 articulated what has
come to be known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 77
This doctrine, which functions in a manner similar to the
exclusionary rule in Miranda,78 prohibits the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution or derivative evidence
acquired through tainted primary evidence. 79 Before the Wong
Sun decision, the admissibility of derivative evidence turned
simply on the notion that "[t]he essence of [an evidentiary]
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all."so
The infeasibility and inflexibility of this strain of jurisprudence
led the Court in Wong Sun to hold that only evidence "come at by
exploitation" of an unconstitutional act is inadmissible derivative
evidence. 81 Moreover, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
applies unless the connection between the Fourth Amendment
417 U.S. 433, 446-52 (1974) (observing that defendants cannot expect police to be
completely flawless).
76 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
77 Id. at 485 (holding "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine "bar[s] from trial physical,
tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion");
see Mark S. Bransdorfer, Note, Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 62 IND. L. J. 1061, 1073 (1987) (stating that Wong Sun does not
present bright line rules for "fruit of the poisonous tree" analyses); see also Leslie-Ann
Marshall Shelby Webb, Jr., Note, The Burger Court's Warm Embrace Of An Impermissibly
Designed Interference With The Sixth Amendment Right To The Assistance of Counsel: The
Adoption Of The Inevitable Discovery Exception To The Exclusionary Rule: Nix v.
Williams, 28 How. L. J. 945, 965 (1985) (noting that Wong Sun devised methods for
determination of which evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree").
78 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86 (discussing exclusionary rule and "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine); see also United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 409-10 (1st Cir.
1998) (noting that Miranda violation does not automatically lead to exclusion under "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine); Winsett v. Washington, 860 F. Supp. 479, 482 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (noting similarities and differences between Miranda exclusionary rule and "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine), aff'd, 130 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1997).
79 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86 (defining exclusionary rule); see also United
States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, at 2629-30 (2004) (noting how Wong Sun excludes
illegally obtained evidence derived from it); Winsett, 860 F. Supp. at 482 (stating that
"[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine ... mandates the exclusion of evidence secured
as a result of unlawful searches and seizures").
80 Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc., v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); see
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 74-5 (1964) (asserting that evidence
obtained by illegal means was not admissible in court); see also Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 340-43 (1939) (granting defendant new trial upon finding evidence had
been gathered in violation of law).
81 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)).
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violation and the derivative evidence is too attenuated.8 2 The
passage of time or "a break in events" determines attenuation.8 3
Significantly, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has
generally been applied so as to exclude only evidence that is
derived from a Fourth Amendment violation.8 4 Indeed,
subsequent to Wong Sun, courts have indicated that the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on the use of involuntary statements
and the Miranda exclusionary rule are constitutionally distinct 85
and that derivative physical evidence must be suppressed as per
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine only if it was discovered
by exploiting an illegal search, for example, through a Fourth
Amendment violation.8 6 However, the application of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine to derivative evidence acquired
through primary evidence that was in turn obtained from an
82 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (noting connection between illegal conduct and
evidence derived can become so attenuated as to limit application of this doctrine); see
also Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341 (acknowledging situations where causal connection
between Fourth Amendment and derivative evidence becomes "so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint"); Brent D. Stratton, Criminal Law: The Attenuation Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 139, 140-41 (1984) (defining attenuation exception to exclusionary rule).
83 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 29-30 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing that passage of time and intervening circumstances contribute to
attenuation); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910-11 (1984) (defining
"dissipation of taint"); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 694 (1982) (naming several
factors for court to consider in determining attenuation, including passage of time and
intervening causes); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979) (considering
closeness in time and existence of intervening factors); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
591-92, 599, 602 (1975) (mentioning two factors contemplated by court with respect to
attenuation).
84 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485-86 (relating Fourth Amendment to "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine); see also United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting that derivative evidence is suppressed only if it was found due to police
exploitation of illegality); Winsett v. Washington, 860 F. Supp. 479, 482 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(describing derivation of "fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine from Fourth Amendment), affd,
130 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1997). But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967)
(discussing rights of parties with respect to identifications before and at trial); Murphy,
378 U.S. at 79 (stating issues with exclusionary rule relating to Fifth Amendment). See
generally Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392 (discussing "independent source" theory).
85 Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the two
protections are constitutionally distinct"); see Elie, 111 F.3d at 1142 (explaining that
statement that is "voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is never 'fruit of the poisonous
tree"); Winsett, 860 F. Supp. at 482 n.2 (noting applications of doctrine to violations of
both Fifth and Sixth Amendment).
86 Elie, 111 F.3d at 1143 (noting that Miranda violations can never be "fruit of the
poisonous tree"); see also Winsett, 860 F. Supp. at 482 (suggesting that "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine is generally applicable to Fourth Amendment violations). See
generally Alan C. Yarcusko, Note, Brown to Payton to Harris: A Fourth Amendment
Double Play by the Supreme Court, 43 CASE WES. RES. L. REV 253, 266-68 (1992)
(discussing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
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unwarned statement remained unsettled following the decision of
the Tenth Circuit in United States v Patane.87
II. DICKERSON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The already convoluted legal landscape concerning the
application of the "fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine within the
context of a Miranda violation became yet more convoluted
following the Court's decision in Dickerson.8 8 The Court in
Dickerson indicated that Miranda was a constitutional rule that
could not be superseded by legislation,8 9 and while the Court
rejected the prophylactic rationale used to create the exceptions
in earlier jurisprudence, 90 it did not overrule any of these cases.91
Rather, the Court incorporated the prophylactic Miranda
exceptions directly into its holding. 92 The Court noted that "our
decision in [Elstad] - refusing to apply the traditional 'fruits'
doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases.., simply
recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the
Fifth Amendment."93 This seeming paradox, that Miranda is a
constitutional rule and that Elstad, Quarles, and Tucker remain
good law, engendered disagreement among the circuits regarding
the application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to
87 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002); see Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922 (1988)
(denying certiorari); Massachusetts v. white, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (affirming lower court
dismissal).
88 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
89 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437-38, 444 (recognizing authority of Miranda); see United
States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing supremacy of Miranda
rule); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting Miranda as
constitutional rule in Dickerson).
90 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437-38; see United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d
1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting rejection that protections provided by Miranda were
"not merely prophylactic"); Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (recognizing Dickerson Court's
preference for Miranda's "constitutional significance").
91 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (recognizing continued validity of previous cases); see
Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1012 (claiming validity of Elstad remained after
Dickerson); see also Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (acknowledging survival of cases like Tucker
and Elstad).
92 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 ("Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation."); see Villalba-Alvarado,
345 F.3d at 1012 (stating that Miranda's established exceptions were still in effect);
Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (suggesting that Dickerson court allowed exceptions to survive
when affirming Miranda).
93 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
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physical evidence derived from an unwarned statement. 94
However, this dissension was, to some degree, alleviated by the
Supreme Court's holding in Patane.95
A. The Approach of the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
In United States v. DeSumma,9 6 United States v. Sterling,97
and United States v. Villalba-Alvarado,98 the Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits respectively held that the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine does not apply so as to exclude physical evidence
acquired through an unwarned statement. 99  In Villalba-
Alvarado, officers conducted controlled drug buys and then
obtained a search warrant that allowed for the search of the
defendant's car, home, and person.lOO After encountering the
defendant in his car near his home, the officers stopped,
handcuffed, and escorted the defendant to his home.101 There,
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, the defendant
voluntarily confessed to the location of narcotics and currency. 102
The court held that the narcotics and currency were admissible
although the evidence was derived from an unwarned
94 See Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1017-18 (comparing post-Dickerson cases in
various circuit courts); United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002)
(stating that Dickerson "undermined the logic underlying Thcker and Elstad"), rev'd, 124
S.Ct. 2620 (2004); United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging coexistence of these cases remaining good law); see also Sterling, 283 F.3d
at 219 (maintaining that "derivative evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned
statement that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is never 'fruit of the poisonous
tree"); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-181 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to voluntary statements before
Miranda warnings).
95 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2624 (2004) (holding Miranda violation
does not exclude physical fruits of voluntary, though unwarned, statements); see United
States v. Ross, 113 Fed. Appx. 884, 886 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting Supreme Court's decision
to overrule Tenth Circuit's decision in Patane); United States v. Sasson, 334 F. Supp. 2d
347, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that "the privilege against self-incrimination does not
bar the admission of fruits of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda").
96 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1028 (2002).
97 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 931 (2002).
98 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
99 Id. at 1020-21 (allowing physical evidence discovered by police to be admissible at
trial); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (ruling that shotgun
found through unwarned statement was properly admitted into evidence); DeSumma, 272
F.3d at 180-81 (holding that doctrine does not apply to derivative evidence secured by
voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings).
100 Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1008 (noting events of procuring and utilizing
warrant).
101 Id. (explaining that upon recognizing defendant in his car, officers arrested him
near his home).
102 Id. (stating that defendant voluntarily told officers where evidence was located).
2005] MIRANDAS EXCESSES
statement. 103 In holding thus, the court determined that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine did not apply so as to
exclude derivative physical evidence acquired through an initial
Miranda violation.104 As the court noted "we refuse to interpret
Dickerson as having altered the exclusionary rule [of Miranda] in
a manner that would ... not permit the admission of derivative
physical evidence."105
Similarly, in DeSumma, a federal agent inquired whether any
weapons were in the possession of an arrested but unwarned
defendant.106 The defendant indicated that there was a firearm
in his vehicle,107 which was subsequently discovered. 08 The
court held that the firearm was admissible though acquired from
an unwarned statement. 109 In so doing, the court applied the
reasoning espoused in Dickerson,110 which distinguished the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment from those
provided by the Fifth Amendment."'1 The court indicated that
the suppression of the unwarned statements was the appropriate
remedy for the Miranda and Fifth Amendment violation112 and
thus "the Miranda presumption ... does not require that the...
fruits [of the statements] be discarded as inherently tainted."113
103 Id. (reversing lower court decision that physical evidence should be suppressed).
104 United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying
voluntariness standard to determine admissibility of evidence derived from Miranda
violation).
105 Id.
106 United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining how
agent asked defendant about weapons in his possession).
107 Id. at 178 (citing defendant's answer that weapon was in his car).
108 Id. (noting defendant gave agents his car pad combination).
109 Id. at 181 (holding pistol as properly admitted).
110 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (distinguishing unreasonable
searches under Fourth Amendment from unwarned interrogation under Fifth
Amendment); see DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (citing Dickerson in reaching rationale for
its holding); see also Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1183 (pointing out split in courts
regarding whether or not "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine should apply to evidence
obtained through unwarned statements).
111 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 (justifying its distinction between Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections); see DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (basing its holding on Dickerson
distinction); see also Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1185 (explaining Dickerson's language
regarding difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence).
112 United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001) (ruling that
unwarned statements are still not admissible without Miranda specifications); see Kirsten
Lela Ambach, Miranda's Poison Fruit Tree: The Admissibility of Physical Evidence
Derived from and Unwarned Statement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 757, 774-75 (2003) (clarifying
court's reaffirmation of Miranda as constitutional rules); Schonwald, supra note 7, at
1193 (explaining split amongst circuits and court's decision in DeSumma regarding
Mirandized statements).
113 DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 179 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).
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As a result, the Third Circuit declined to apply the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine so as to suppress derivative physical
evidence acquired from an unwarned statement. 114
And in Sterling, the court held that the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine did not apply to physical evidence derived from an
unwarned statement. 115 The police, in the course of an arrest,116
without first administering Miranda warnings,117 asked whether
the defendant had any weapons.ll8 The defendant indicated that
there was a firearm in his truck,119 which was subsequently
discovered by the police.1 20 The court held that the firearm was
admissible because the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does
not apply in the context of a Miranda violation.121 Utilizing the
same rationale employed in DeSumma,122 the court noted that
"the Court's reference to and reaffirmation of Miranda's progeny
[in Dickerson] indicates that the established exceptions, like
those in Tucker and Elstad, survive."123 Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit also declined to make use of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine so as to exclude physical evidence
114 DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (holding doctrine as not applicable to physical
evidence obtained through unwarned statements); see Ambach, supra note 112, at 774
(announcing Third Circuit's refusal to apply fruits doctrine to physical fruits of Miranda
violation); see also Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1194 (concluding that Third Circuit
interpreted Dickerson as allowing such evidence as admissible).
115 United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding physical
evidence obtained through unwarned statement as admissible at trial).
116 Id. at 217-8 (noting police responded to domestic disturbance call); see Ambach,
supra note 112, at 775 (recounting facts of Sterling).
117 Sterling, 283 F.3d at 218 (describing conversation between officers and
defendant); see Ambach, supra note 112, at 775 (noting that defendant was "unwarned").
118 Sterling, 283 F.3d at 218 (stating questions asked by officers).
119 Id. (noting defendant voluntarily told police about the shotgun).
120 Id. (indicating defendant was subsequently charged with possession of both guns).
121 United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218 (asserting that "there is no
exclusionary rule that pertains to violations of Miranda when physical evidence is
seized"); see Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1194 (comparing Sterling and DeSumma).
122 See United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
"fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to derivative evidence secured as a
result of a voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings are issued"); see also
Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1337, 1354 n.97 (2003) (noting that
Sterling and DeSumma had similar holdings); Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1193-94
(describing that in both Sterling and DeSumma the court found distinction between
admissibility of statements under Fifth Amendment and derivative evidence under
Fourth Amendment).
123 Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; see Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1194 (stating that Court
interpreted Dickerson holding to indicate that Miranda exceptions were not overruled).
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derived from primary evidence acquired from an unwarned
statement. 124
B. The First Circuit Approach
In United States v. Faulkingham, the First Circuit held that
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applied so as to exclude
derivative physical evidence acquired through intentional
violations of Miranda,125 not merely negligent police acts. 126 In
Faulkingham, the defendant made inculpatory statements to
drug enforcement officers prior to receiving Miranda
warnings.127 These statements led to the derivative testimony of
a co-conspiratorZ28 as well as a quantity of drugs.129 However,
there was no evidence that the police intentionally withheld the
defendant's Miranda warnings.130 The court held that the
derivative evidence in this matter ought not to be suppressed,'31
as the Miranda violation could not be seen as willful or
intentional.132 Thus, the First Circuit limited the application of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine so as to exclude evidence
124 Sterling, 283 F.3d at 218 (allowing evidence to be admitted); see Schonwald, supra
note 7, at 1194 (stating court's holding); see also Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced
Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 74 n.101 (2002)
(stating that Fourth Circuit declined to suppress physical evidence of an un-Mirandized
confession).
125 United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing
defendant's motion to suppress evidence).
126 Id. (explaining court's holding).
127 Id. at 87-88 (noting magistrate judge's statement that agent "understood that he
had a suspect in custody that he intended to interrogate"); see Schonwald, supra, note 7,
at 1194 (reiterating facts of Faulkingham).
128 Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 88 n.1 (noting that co-conspirator cooperated with
government and became witness against defendant); see Ambach, supra note 112, at 776
(describing that defendant's unwarned statements led officers to drug supplier, who
became state's witness against defendant).
129 Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 88-89 (indicating seizure of drugs); see Ambach, supra
note 112, at 776 (noting that defendant's unwarned statements led officer's to drug
supplier, who in turn led officer's to heroin).
130 Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94 (noting that there was no coercive or deliberate
misconduct by agents); see Ambach, supra note 112, at 776 (stating that there was no
evidence that police deliberately failed to give defendant proper warnings).
131 United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing lower
court's grant of suppression motion); see Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1195 (noting that
court admitted derivative evidence).
132 Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94 (noting that while officers acted negligently, they
did not deliberately fail to provide Miranda warnings); see Ambach, supra note 112, at
776 (stating that court can still admit derivative evidence of an un-Mirandized warning
where officer's failure to do so is not deliberate).
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derived from an intentional violation of a defendant's Miranda
rights. 133
C. The Tenth Circuit Approach
In Patane, the Tenth Circuit held that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine applied so as to exclude derivative
physical evidence acquired through both negligent and
intentional Miranda violations.134 As indicated above,135 the
defendant in Patane interrupted the police before they had
concluded administering Miranda warnings.136 Subsequently,
the defendant indicated that he had a firearm in his
possession,137 which was recovered by the police.138 The court
held that the firearm should be excluded, as it was acquired
through Miranda violation.139 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
dramatically extended the reasoning of the Faulkingham court
and applied the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine so as to
exclude evidence derived from any type of Miranda violation.140
133 Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93 (stating that role of deterrence was weaker in this
case because it was not officers' intention to elicit statements from defendant); see
Mannheimer, supra note 124, at 74 n.101 (noting court's holding as allowing suppression
of evidence where police deliberately failed to provide Miranda warnings but not where
police acted negligently); see also Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1195 (concluding that First
Circuit left open possibility that fruits of the poisonous tree would be suppressed where
police deliberately fail to provide Miranda warnings).
134 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (suppressing
physical fruits of Miranda violation), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); see Schonwald, supra
note 7, at 1195-96 (examining court's holding in Patane).
135 See supra notes 11-31, 33-39 and accompanying text.
136 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1015 (stating that defendant interrupted Miranda warnings
as they were being given by arresting police officers).
137 Id. (stating that defendant informed police that he had .357 that was in police
custody and Glock on his dresser); see Nicole L. Angarella and Peter Bowman Rutledge,
An End of Term Exam: October Term 2003 at the Supreme Court of the United States, 54
CATH. U. L. REV. 151, 180 (2004) (noting that defendant subsequently filed motion to
suppress firearm in District Court).
138 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1015 (stating that firearm was recovered by police).
139 Id. at 1029 (stating that physical evidence that resulted from Miranda violation
should be excluded); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (stating that "unless
and until such [Miranda] warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the
defendant]").
140 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that
limiting "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to intentional violation would depend on
subjective intent of police officer and would present extreme evidentiary difficulties),
rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
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III. THE PLURALITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In United States v. Patane, the Court ruled, in a plurality
opinion, that the failure to give a suspect the warnings
prescribed by Miranda does not require the suppression of the
physical "fruits" of a suspect's unwarned but voluntary
statements. 141 The plurality explained that the Miranda rule is a
prophylactic tenet that is employed so as to guard against
violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.142 However, the plurality noted that the Self-
Incrimination Clause "is not implicated by the admission into
evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary," though unwarned,
statement.1 43 Accordingly, the plurality concluded that "there is
no justification for extending the Miranda rule to this
context."144 The plurality maintained that the Miranda rule is
not a code of police conduct, and thus the police do not violate the
Constitution, or even the Miranda rule, by the mere failure to
administer warnings at the outset of a custodial interrogation.145
Thus, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as developed by
the Court in Wong Sun v. United States, does not apply to
evidence derived from a Miranda violation.146
141 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2630 (2004) (holding that admission of
physical fruits present no risk that defendant's coerced statements will be used against
him in court).
142 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (2004) (stating that Miranda warnings aren't codes
of police conduct, but rules designed to protect core rights); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that Miranda warnings and other procedural safeguards act
to "provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination");
see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (asserting that "[riules designed to
safeguard a constitutional right... do not extend the scope of the constitutional right
itself').
143 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (stating that Self-Incrimination Clause is not
implicated by admission of "physical fruit," because it only applies to statements of
defendant); see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 671 (1984) (noting that interrogation
which results in additional evidence is similar to compulsory taking of blood samples); see
also United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that "fruit"
doctrine never applies to derivative evidence obtained from unwarned statement that was
voluntary under Fifth Amendment).
144 Patane, 124 S.Ct. at 2626.
145 Id. (explaining that unwarned statement is not equivalent to compelled statement
for purposes of Fifth Amendment); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966)
(stating that Congress and States are free to develop their own safeguards for Fifth
Amendment privilege, as long as safeguards are effective); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (noting that lack of warnings creates legal presumption of coercion,
not an automatic violation of Fifth Amendment).
146 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630 (declining to extend Wong Sun to "mere" failures of
police officer to give Miranda warnings); see Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (stating that
derivative evidence coming from unwarned, voluntary statement does not fall within
20051
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The plurality further noted that the core protection afforded by
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is "a
prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against
himself at trial."i47 Thus, the Constitution seemingly cannot be
violated by the introduction of non-testimonial evidence derived
from voluntary, though unwarned, statements.1 48 Further, the
plurality found an analogous constitutional proposition in Oregon
v. Elstad to be persuasive, to wit: "that statements taken without
Miranda warnings ... can be used to impeach a defendant's
testimony at trial." 49 The plurality noted that "generally, the
Miranda rule 'does not require that the statements [taken
without complying with the rule] and their fruits be discarded as
inherently tainted."' 50 Indeed, "[s]uch a blanket suppression rule
could not be justified by reference to the 'Fifth Amendment goal
scope of "fruit of the poisonous tree" rule, although Miranda rules cannot be overruled by
legislative action); see also Leading Case, Fifth Amendment - Testimonial Fruits, 118
HARv. L. REV. 296, 302-303 (2004) (arguing that distinguishing between Miranda
warnings and "poisoned fruit" doctrine for derivative evidence would result in narrow
test for "poisoned fruit" doctrine based on voluntary nature of statement, resulting in "a
hierarchy of Self-Incrimination Clause violations").
147 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004); see Chavez, 538 U.S. 764-
768 (limiting application of self incrimination privilege to criminal proceedings, not
criminal investigations); see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that privilege might extend to bar compelled
production of any incriminating evidence, testimonial or otherwise); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263, at 378 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(explaining that Clause "was directed at the employment of legal process to extract from
the person's own lips an admission of guilt, which would thus take the place of other
evidence").
148 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2631 (noting that derivative evidence admitted in this
matter does not run risk of violating defendants right against self-incrimination, and has
significant probative value if reliable); United States v. Reynolds, 334 F. Supp. 2d 909,
912-3 (W.D. Va. 2004) (stating that "[i]ntroduction of non-testimonial evidence obtained
as a result of voluntary statements does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause"); see
also Charles H. Whitebread, The Rule of Law, Judicial Self-Restraint, and Unanswered
Questions: Decisions of the United States Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term, 26 WHITTIER
L. REV. 101, 124 (2004) (positing that Court's holding illustrates that right against self-
incrimination only relates to exclusion of testimonial evidence, which would make
inclusion of non-testimonial evidence constitutional).
149 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2627 (explaining limitations of Miranda rule); see Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1985) (noting that for unwarned statements "the primary
criterion of admissibility [remains] the 'old' due process voluntariness test") (quoting
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 877 (1981)); see also New
Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457-59 (1979) (noting distinction between voluntary and
compelled statements); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (stating that
privilege granted by Fifth Amendment "cannot be construed to include the right to
commit perjury").
150 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307).
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of assuring trustworthy evidence' or by any deterrence
rationale."151
Furthermore, the plurality emphasized the exclusionary
concept inherent within the textual mandate of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."152 It drew a
distinction between this exclusionary rule and the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches, by
noting that "the Self-Incrimination Clause is self-executing. We
have repeatedly explained 'that those subjected to coercive police
interrogations have an automatic protection from the use of their
involuntary statements ... in any subsequent criminal trial."'153
This textual mandate and self-executing protection creates "a
strong presumption against expanding the Miranda rule any
further." 154
Moreover, the plurality indicated that "nothing in Dickerson,
including its characterization of Miranda as announcing a
constitutional rule, changes any of these observations." 155 For in
Dickerson, the Court went to great pains to note that
"subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule
on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming [Miranda's] core
ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in
the prosecution's case in chief."156 This explication of the scope of
Miranda's protections, to wit: "unwarned statements may not be
used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief," limits, as the
plurality noted, the protections of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. 157 In addition, the reliance and incorporation of Elstad,
Tucker, and Quarles in Dickerson, seemingly confirmed the
151 Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-
49 (1974) (stating that Miranda rule doesn't contemplate police work without any error);
see also Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26 (explaining limits of Miranda rule in context of
impeachment).
152 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
153 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 1260, 2628 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 769 (2003)).
154 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 1268.
155 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (citations omitted).
156 Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000)).
157 See id. at 2628-29 (explaining interaction between Fifth Amendment and holding
in Miranda); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1984) (limiting
protections of Miranda through public safety exception). But see Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ('The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that
statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of
his 'rights,' may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.")
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validity of the preceding proposition.15s Thus, as the plurality
curtly concluded, "nothing in Dickerson calls into question our
continued insistence that the closest possible fit be maintained
between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to
protect it."159 However, while reaching the correct holding, the
plurality did not comment on the application of the foregoing
principles to an intentional rather than negligent Miranda
violation. 160 Thus, the plurality reversed the decision of the
Tenth Circuit and, as a consequence, established the intellectual
underpinnings of post-Dickerson analysis with respect to both
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine and the Fifth
Amendment.161
IV. THE "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" DOCTRINE DOES NOT
APPLY SO AS TO EXCLUDE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM A
MIRANDA VIOLATION
The Tenth Circuit erred by applying the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine so as to exclude physical evidence derived from a
negligent Miranda violation. 162 The "fruit of the poisonous tree"
158 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (advancing "[t]he proposition that failure to comply
with Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central to the
holdings of Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad"); see Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (positing
"[t]he Court's reliance on our Miranda precedents, including both Tucker and Elstad,
further demonstrates the continuing validity of those decisions"); see also Leading Case,
supra note 146, at 299-300 (commenting that in Patane, "Justice Kennedy, concurring in
the judgment... agreed that Dickerson had not undermined the exceptions to Miranda
created in Harris, Quarles, and Elstad").
159 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004).
160 See generally Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (declining to mention intent when
deciding "that a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a
suspect's constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule"); United States v. Faulkingham,
295 F.3d 85, 93-4 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting "no reason to think that the agents deliberately
failed to give the warning in order to get the physical evidence"); Lt. Co. David H.
Robertson, Self-Incrimination: Big Changes in the Wind, 2004 ARMY LAW. 37, 49 (2004)
(commenting on Tenth Circuit's finding "that the deterrent effect of suppressing negligent
violations also, would help ensure that officers were properly trained to protect this
important constitutional right of its citizens").
161 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630 (reversing judgment of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals).
See generally Angarella & Rutledge, supra note 137, at 181 (noting plurality's decision
that "while Dickerson characterized Miranda as a constitutional rule, it did not override
the requirement of a 'close fit' between the core constitutional right and the exclusionary
remedy"); John H. Blume ET. AL., Education and Interrogation: Comparing Brown and
Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 345 n.91 (2005) (asserting that Patane "erased any
doubts as to whether Dickerson might have overturned prior Court rulings that 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' analysis would not apply to Miranda").
162 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630 (holding that although "it is true that the Court
requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements, it must be
remembered that statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to
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doctrine does not mandate the suppression of physical evidence
derived from a statement acquired absent Miranda warnings.163
The reasoning of the Court in Elstad and Tucker, as well as the
casting of Miranda as a constitutional rule,164 does not support
such a dramatic expansion of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine.165 In fact, such an expansion would mark a significant
departure from Miranda's purpose166 and would unduly burden
have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination"). But see United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013,
1027 (10th Cir., 2002) (choosing to "decline to adopt the position of the Third and Fourth
Circuits that the Wong Sun fruits doctrine never applies to Miranda violations"). See
generally Leading Case, supra note 146, at 296 (articulating holding of Patane as
"physical evidence derived from unwarned voluntary statements is admissible at trial").
163 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (explaining that not
"all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light
but for the illegal actions of the police"); see also United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135,
1142 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding it "well established that the failure to deliver Miranda
warnings is not itself a constitutional violation. As a result, we hold that Wong Sun and
its 'fruit of the poisonous tree' analysis is inapplicable in cases involving mere departures
from Miranda"); Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 279 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"even where an interrogation occurs after the Miranda decision, and warnings required
by it are not given, the deterrent effect of excluding third party testimonial fruits of an
otherwise voluntary statement is not sufficient to warrant exclusion"). But see United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967) (applying test for admissibility of illegally
obtained identification evidence as "whether, granting the establishment of the primary
illegality, the identification evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint"); Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (holding "the constitutional rule to be that a
state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him"); Silverthorne
Lumber Co., Inc., v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.").
164 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (acknowledging Dickerson established Miranda as
constitutional rule); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (concluding that
"Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by
an Act of Congress"); Victoria Newnham Matthews, Miranda Rule is a Constitutional
Rule: Dickerson v. United States, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 421 (2000) (acknowledging "in
Dickerson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court upheld Miranda v. Arizona,
declaring that decision a constitutional rule which Congress cannot supersede").
165 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004) (stating that "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine" does not apply to Miranda violations); see also Angarella &
Rutledge, supra note 137, at 180-181 (noting plurality opinion in Patane favored per se
rule that Miranda violations do not require suppression of physical evidence); Leading
Case, supra note 146, at 298-99 (explaining in Patane '"Thomas conceded that the Court
had sometimes created prophylactic rules that 'necessarily swept beyond the actual
protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause' but maintained that 'any further extension
of these rules must be justified by its necessity for the protection of the actual right
against compelled self-incrimination"').
166 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2627 (noting Fifth Amendment goal of providing
"trustworthy" evidence); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435 (noting that Miranda established rule
for admissibility of statements); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding
that "to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
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the truth seeking purpose of criminal trials. 167 Consequently, the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine should not and indeed does
not apply so as to exclude physical evidence derived from
unwarned statements. 168
A. Dickerson Does Not Warrant the Application of the "Fruit of
the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine in the Miranda Context
The Tenth Circuit found support for extending the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine" in the Miranda context based on the
Court's decision in Dickerson, which recognized that Miranda is a
constitutional rule.169 However, nothing in the recognition that
Miranda is a constitutional rule suggests that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine applies to Miranda violations.170 To the
contrary, the Court's decision in Dickerson relied on existing
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored").
167 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (acknowledging Miranda's downside as some guilty
defendants may go free); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (positing
that Miranda is prophylactic in nature because it may bar evidence that is not actually
involuntary); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (stating that "[i]f errors are made
by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they
should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth
Amendment itself'). See generally Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (clarifying
that Miranda rights "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was
protected"); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that "[t]he shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances").
168 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629 (concluding "[t]here is therefore no reason to apply the
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine" to physical evidence derived from unwarned
statements); see United States v. Lewis, 110 Fed. Appx. 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (following
Patane that "failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of
physical fruits of that suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements"); United States v.
Reynolds, 334 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911-12 (W.D. Va. 2004) ("The Supreme Court held in a
recent plurality opinion that failure to advise a defendant of his Miranda rights does not
require suppression of the physical fruits of the defendant's unwarned, but voluntary,
statements.").
169 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir., 2002) (arguing
"Dickerson has undercut the premise upon which that application of Elstad and Tucker
was based because Dickerson now concludes that an un-Mirandized statement, even if
voluntary, is a Fifth Amendment violation"), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); Dickerson, 530
U.S. 431; see Mannheimer, supra note 124, at 129 n.101 (commenting that Patane and
Faulkingham both relied on fact that Dickerson held Miranda as constitutionally based).
170 See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting
Supreme Court "has used broad language, discouraging the use of the fruits doctrine
following a Miranda violation, whatever the nature of the derivative evidence"); United
States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting derivative evidence obtained
as result of voluntary, though unwarned statement, is never "fruit of the poisonous tree");
United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating no constitutional
violation occurs with use of evidence derived from voluntary statement).
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limits to the Miranda rule as a basis for declining to overrule
Miranda.171 Further, Dickerson does not undermine the
analytical foundations of cases such as Elstad and Tucker.172
Dickerson's recognition that the Miranda rule is constitutional in
origin does not mean that a failure to give warnings is equivalent
to actual coercion. 173
The Tenth Circuit indicated that "Dickerson undermined the
logic underlying Tucker and Elstad."174 In reaching its conclusion
that the Miranda rule was a "constitutional decision,"175
however, the Court in Dickerson referred explicitly and favorably
to Elstad's rejection of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine.176 Dickerson, therefore, did not change the established
proposition detailed in Elstad that limited the scope of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the Miranda context. 177 Indeed,
171 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-444 (2000) (recalling "our
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may
not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief"). See generally United States v.
Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629-30 (2004) (noting "Dickerson's characterization of Miranda
as a constitutional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the closest possible fit
between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any judge-made rule designed to protect it");
Conor G. Bateman, Case Note, Dickerson v. United States, Miranda is Deemed a
Constitutional Rule, but Does it Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 177, 192-193 (2002)
(noting that Dickerson Court relied on Court's creation of exceptions to Miranda rule).
172 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (stating that Dickerson does not call into question
court's continued insistence that close connection between Self-Incrimination Clause and
any rule created to protect it be maintained); see also Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93
(asserting that Dickerson cited Elstad without overruling it, by recognizing fact that
"unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment"); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443-44 (noting that
cases subsequent to Miranda have reaffirmed its core ruling).
173 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94 (stating that, based on facts of this case,
failure of agents to give Miranda warnings was not tantamount to actual coercion); see
also Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (establishing that Miranda only held that certain warnings
must be given to admit suspect's statements made during custodial interrogation into
evidence); DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (holding that "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
does not apply to derivative evidence secured as a result of a voluntary statement").
174 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1019.
175 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
176 Id. at 441 (explaining that court's refusal to apply traditional "fruits" doctrine in
Elstad does not prove that Miranda is a non-constitutional decision, but merely
demonstrates that unreasonable searches under Fourth Amendment are different from
unwarned interrogations under Fifth Amendment).
177 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (concluding that cases
subsequent to Miranda have not undermined its doctrinal underpinnings); Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985) (stating that "[a] subsequent administration of Miranda
warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily
should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier
statement"); see Bateman, supra note 171, at 219 (noting that "[i]n Dickerson, it appears
that the Supreme Court has again affirmed the principle that derivative evidence may be
admitted against the defendant if the taint has been sufficiently purged").
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the Court in Dickerson placed critical reliance on the continuing
validity of its post-Miranda cases, including Tucker and Elstad,
explaining that those cases had "reduced the impact of the
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming
the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be
used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief."178 Dickerson
thus maintained the difference between the admissibility of
unwarned statements in the government's case in chief and the
admissibility of evidence derived from an unwarned voluntary
statement. 179 And as noted above, Tucker and Elstad maintain
that evidence derived from unwarned statements is
admissible,18 0  so long as the unwarned statements were
voluntary under the traditional due process test. 181
B. Extending Miranda's Exclusionary Rule Burdens the Truth-
Seeking Function of Criminal Trials
While Miranda may be a constitutional decision,I8 2 the nature
of the constitutional rights implicated in Miranda are of
paramount importance in considering the consequences of the
178 Dickerson, 530 U.S. 443-44.
179 See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 94 (2002) (indicating that while
facts of this case do not implicate any Fourth Amendment concerns, facts of other cases
might and should be determined accordingly); see also United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d
216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (reaffirming that distinction between statements and derivative
evidence survives Dickerson); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir.
2001) (stating that distinction exists between evidence obtained from voluntary statement
and evidence obtained from unreasonable search or coerced confession).
180 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 (asserting that confessions obtained after an illegal
arrest should be excluded from evidence unless an intervening occurrence breaks the
connection between the arrest and confession); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446-52 (1974) (holding that police's failure to fully give respondent his Miranda warnings
did not require exclusion of evidence obtained from the statement); State of Washington v.
Lozano, 882 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1994) (stating that "[o]nly evidence obtained in which
violations of the right to Miranda warnings involve actual coercion will result in
suppression as 'fruits of the poisonous tree"').
181 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300 (holding that voluntary statement given after
Miranda warnings is admissible, despite prior unwarned statements, so long as neither
was coerced); see also United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that exceptions outlined in Tucker and Elstad supported holding that
evidence obtained as a result of unwarned, voluntary statement is never "fruit of the
poisonous tree"). See generally Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 85 (illustrating case where
derivative evidence obtained from an unwarned, voluntary statement is admissible).
182 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (asserting that Miranda rule
is constitutional in nature); see United States v. Chen, 104 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (noting Dickerson opinion and its ruling that Miranda is constitutional rule); see
also United States v. Kruger, 151 F. Supp. 2d 86, 101 (D. Me. 2001) (finding that
Dickerson "changed the landscape" by conferring constitutional status on Miranda
warnings).
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Dickerson decision. 83 A statement given without the warnings
mandated by Miranda does not, standing alone, constitute
compulsion as understood in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.18 4
Instead, Miranda created an evidentiary rule designed to
prohibit the use of a compelled statement.18 5 Thus, Miranda
developed an exclusionary rule for only unwarned statements.18 6
The admission of physical evidence derived from voluntary
unwarned statements does not implicate the possibility that a
compelled statement will be used.1 87 Consequently, physical
evidence acquired from unwarned statements does not fall within
the scope of the exclusionary rule.18 8 To suppress physical
evidence acquired in this manner would constitute an
unwarranted extension of Miranda at an excessive cost to the
truth-seeking function of a criminal trial.18 9 The costs of
183 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 94 (stating importance of making a determination
of which constitutional rights are implicated in particular case); see also Sterling, 283
F.3d at 219 (analyzing Dickerson's conclusion that Miranda is with constitutional
significance). See generally DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (demonstrating different ways
that constitutional rights are implicated).
184 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding volunteered statements
of any kind are not barred by Fifth Amendment); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 170 (1986) (discussing nature and effect of coercion by police). See generally Fare v.
Michael, 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (providing explanation of police coercion and illustrating
case devoid of police intimidation or perception).
185 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 461, 478 (outlining evidentiary rule designed to
exclude unwarned statements made under compulsion); see also United States v. Patane,
124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (explaining that Miranda rule is prophylactic and is utilized
to prevent violations of Self-Incrimination Clause). See generally United States v.
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (2002) (describing how Miranda's evidentiary rule is applied in
practice).
186 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 461, 478 (asserting that Miranda rule applies only
to unwarned statements); see also Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2627 (stating that Miranda rule
creates presumption of coercion in absence of particular warnings). See generally
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (discussing proper application of Miranda
rule to unwarned statements).
187 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 94 (stating that negligence of agents to administer
Miranda warnings resulted in suppression of confession); see also United States v.
Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing significance of unwarned
statements and their admissibility); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
Cir. 2001) (asserting that Fifth Amendment prevents use of non-Mirandized statements).
188 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 91 (asserting three categories of evidence that may
be considered derivative fruits of un-Mirandized confession: physical evidence, statements
made by someone other than unwarned defendant, and future statements made by
defendant after initial unwarned statement); see also Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629 (stating
that because of difference between unwarned statements and unreasonable searches
under Fourth Amendment, there is no reason to apply "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine for Miranda violations). See generally Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (discussing way in
which physical evidence may be admissible despite fact that defendant made unwarned
statements which were inadmissible).
189 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (stating that unless
prosecution can show that the warnings and waiver were made as threshold matter, it
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excluding voluntary and reliable unwarned statements are
weighty.190 The Court has determined that, in order to protect
Fifth Amendment rights, the cost of excluding some reliable and
otherwise admissible evidence is outweighed by the interest in
protecting against admission of a compelled confession against a
defendant. 191 Thus, "[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements,
when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient
remedy." 192 Accordingly, there is no sufficient justification for
excluding physical evidence that the police discover as a result of
an unwarned statement. 193 The consequent costs to the truth
seeking function of trials caused by the suppression of reliable
physical evidence is not and cannot be balanced by any
countervailing policy justifications. 194
In Patane, the government sought to introduce at trial the
firearm whose location the defendant provided to police.195 The
unwarned statement would, of course, not be used in the course
cannot overcome objections to the use of such statements obtained from a suspect during
custodial interrogation at trial); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)
(explaining that confessions obtained through custodial interrogation after illegal arrest
must be excluded unless an exception applies); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450
(1974) (asserting that balance exists between society's interest in prosecuting criminals
and protection afforded to defendant's by pre-Miranda standards); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 225, 226 (1971) (discussing how defendant's voluntary statements made under
oath interact with traditional rules of perjury).
190 See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (noting many voluntary
statements will be excluded); Withrow, 507 U.S. at 690 (acknowledging that some
statements not traditionally deemed involuntary may be excluded); see also Elstad, 470
U.S. at 306 (comparing Fourth and Fifth Amendments); cf. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450
(considering strong interest in making relevant information available to trier of fact);
Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26 (mentioning truth-testing devices used by adversarial system).
191 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding that "when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized"); see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 (balancing interest of
constitutionally protected rights with making relevant information available to trier of
fact); c.f. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26 (allowing statement taken in violation of Miranda to
be used for impeachment purposes).
192 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
193 See e.g., United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 94 (2002) (allowing
derivative evidence to be used); see also United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th
Cir. 2002) (holding that district court was correct denying suppression of physical
evidence); c.f. United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
suppressing physical evidence was "inconsistent with deterring improper police conduct
and the goal of assuring trustworthy evidence").
194 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94 (noting derivative evidence as reliable); see
also Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (allowing shotgun into evidence); DeSumma, 272 F.3d at
180 (stating "fruit of the poisonous tree" does not apply to derivative evidence).
195 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 2002) (suppressing gun
as physical fruit of Miranda violation), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
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of the government's direct case. 196 Therefore, the possible
infringement of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to
have any compelled statements admitted in evidence against him
would not be implicated.197 To suppress the firearm as well
would impose an insurmountable impediment to the
government's ability to prosecute criminal defendants.198 An
otherwise effective grant of immunity from prosecution is a
disproportionate cost for society to bear because the police failed
to provide complete warnings to a suspect before asking him
questions.199
C. No Policy Justifications Serve to Validate the Suppression of
Physical Evidence Derived from an Unwarned Statement
Significantly, until the plurality decision in Patane, it was not
clear whether physical evidence derived from statements
acquired in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the
government's case-in-chief.200 Yet, assuming arguendo that a
derivative physical evidence exclusionary rule is applicable
where there is a showing of actual police coercion or violent
procedures, 201 the rationalization and justification for such an
196 Id. at 1018-19 (noting government's concession that statements made were
inadmissible under Miranda).
197 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 92 (discussing Elstad decision and its opinion that
Fifth Amendment is not concerned with non-testimonial evidence); see also Sterling, 283
F.3d at 219 (stating "derivative evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement
that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is never 'fruit of the poisonous tree'); c.f.
DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (mentioning policy reasons for allowing physical evidence).
198 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (comparing Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections); c.f. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (asserting that
"we must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the
trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to
adduce"). See generally Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (discussing
prosecutors burden of proof).
199 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 (noting that fruits need not be discarded as inherently
tainted); see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 (discussing society's interest in effective
prosecution of criminals); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1959, 1995 n.183 (2004) (analyzing effect Miranda has had on prosecutors).
200 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626-30 (2004) (allowing physical
derivative evidence to be used); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)
(stating that unless Miranda warnings are given, no evidence obtained from interrogation
can be used against defendant); c.f. United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-19 (4th
Cir. 2002) (holding that Fifth Amendment rights are not violated by admitting derivative
physical evidence).
201 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 672 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating "when the Miranda violation consists of a deliberate
and flagrant abuse of the accused's constitutional rights, amounting to a denial of due
process, application of a broader exclusionary rule is warranted."); see also Sterling, 283
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exclusionary rule is inapplicable absent actual compulsion. The
Fifth Amendment is not intrinsically concerned with physical
evidence, and judicial extensions of the Fifth Amendment must
be developed with greater moderation where physical evidence,
which does not have a testimonial component, is sought to, be
excluded. 202 Moreover, the policy of deterrence is inapplicable
within this context because there does not exist a constitutional
prohibition against interrogation absent the administration of
Miranda warnings. 203 Furthermore, the current exclusionary
rule does afford a deterrent by mandating the suppression of the
unwarned statement.204 Additionally, the unreliability concerns
that stem from statements acquired through actual coercion are
irrelevant where the statements are not admitted in the
government's case-in-chief and actual coercion has not been
demonstrated.205 Simply put, the unreliability of a statement
does not affect physical evidence. As the Court noted in Patane,
"unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or
actual violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self-
Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to
warn, nothing to deter."206
F.3d at 218 (noting decision in Elstad, which held "a voluntary statement given after
Miranda warnings is admissible, notwithstanding prior unwarned statements, so long as
both statements were not coerced"); c.f. United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting voluntary and uncoerced evidence is admissible).
202 See DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 170 (noting that Fifth Amendment prevents use of
compelled statements); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (stating that prosecution may
not use statements obtained through custodial interrogation, absent procedural
safeguards). See generally Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (proposing derivative evidence
obtained from voluntary, unwarned statement is never "fruit of the poisonous tree").
203 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (noting that no evidence resulting from
interrogation may be used against defendant); see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
223-26 (1971) (discussing Miranda and how it only bars introduction of testimonial
evidence at trial seized absent Miranda warnings); c.f. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
439 (1974) (noting Fifth Amendment clause as reading "[n]o person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself').
204 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (holding that statements obtained in violation of
Miranda must be suppressed); see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 (noting that unwarned
statement had already been excised). See generally Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26 (allowing
statements to be used for impeachment).
205 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (noting that statements given freely without
coercion are generally admissible); see also DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (asserting that
"[t]he element of police misconduct is not a factor that comes into play when the
prosecution uses a voluntary statement"); c.f. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460
(1972) (noting inadmissibility of coerced confessions).
206 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629 (2004). The Court in Patane also
refused to apply the balancing test of Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939),
because Patane did not involve a violation of either a statute or the Constitution. Patane,
124 S. Ct. 2620, at 2629 n.4.
MIRANDA'S EXCESSES
1. The Fifth Amendment Is Not Textually Concerned with
Physical Evidence
In assessing whether courts should suppress physical evidence
derived from a failure to give Miranda warnings, it must be
acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment itself is not directly
concerned with physical evidence. 207 The Self-Incrimination
Clause deals exclusively with testimony; it does not, however,
prohibit the provision of non-testimonial evidentiary
materials. 208 That principle was articulated in Schmerber v.
California,209 which was decided shortly after the Miranda
decision. In Schmerber, the Court held that the extraction of
blood from a defendant and the use of its analysis at trial did not
offend the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 210
The Court held that "the privilege [against self-incrimination]
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature,"211 and that "the
withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to those ends."212 The Court
indicated that "[s]ince the blood test evidence, although an
incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege
207 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000) (discussing text of Fifth
Amendment); see also DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180 (noting that Fifth Amendment prevents
use of statements, not physical evidence). See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (analyzing judicial history of Fifth Amendment).
208 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (discussing privilege
extending to an accused's communications but not to compelled fingerprinting,
photographing, measurements, writings or speaking for identification, appearing in court,
standing, or making a particular gesture); see also Gabrielle Porter Dennison, Self-
Incrimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Federal and Connecticut Constitutional
Provisions, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1994) (stating provision against self-
incrimination did not reach physical evidence, such as "hairs, fibers, handwriting, and
blood samples" that were taken from defendant); Ryan McLennan, Supreme Court
Review: Does Immunity Granted Really Equal Immunity Received?, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 469, 472 (2001) (commenting that Schmerber Court narrowed the reach of
Self-Incrimination Clause by permitting compelled production of blood).
209 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
210 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (holding blood test was not protected by Self-
Incrimination Clause because it was neither defendant's testimony nor evidence of
communicative act by defendant).
211 Id. at 761.
212 Id.
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grounds." 213  Schmerber thus establishes that the Self-
Incrimination Clause does not bar the admission of non-
testimonial evidence compelled from an individual. 214 For
example, an individual may be compelled to provide a blood
sample, as in Schmerber,2 15 a voice exemplar, 2 16 or a handwriting
sample. 217  Similarly, an individual may be required to
participate in a lineup, 218 or to try on clothing in court. 219
However, Patane raises an issue that is quite different from
the Schmerber line of reasoning because the defendant made
testimonial communications that led the police to the
incriminating evidence. 220 Seemingly, Patane conceptually falls
between the distinct extremes of Schmerber and the effects of the
traditional exclusionary rule. As Judge Friendly noted, the use
213 Id. at 765.
214 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (concluding defendant's
testimony or evidence relating to communication by defendant are the only types of
evidence protected by Self-Incrimination Clause); see Dennison, supra note 208, at 747-48
(highlighting particular types of physical evidence not protected by Self-Incrimination
Clause); see also McLennan, supra note 208, at 472 (noting Schmerber decision permitted
compelled blood production as evidence).
215 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (holding compelled blood sample admissible into
evidence); see also Dennison, supra note 208, at 747-48 (discussing narrowing of Self-
Incrimination Clause in 1960's to include blood samples); McLennan, supra note 208, at
472 (highlighting admissibility of compelled blood samples into evidence).
216 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (holding "compelled
production of the voice exemplars would [not] violate the Fifth Amendment"); see also
Charles Gardner Geyh, The Testimonial Component of the Right Against Self.
Incrimination, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 611, 612 (1987) (discussing compulsion by government
to have defendant speak certain words or phrases); McLennan, supra note 208, at 472
(noting Self-Incrimination Clause does not extend to voice exemplars).
217 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding handwriting
samples did not violate any constitutional rights); see also Geyh, supra note 216, at 612
(stating that Court permitted handwriting samples into evidence although they were
compelled by government); McLennan, supra note 208, at 472 (noting Self-Incrimination
Clause does not extend to handwriting samples).
218 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (holding government
compulsion of defendant participating in a lineup does not violate Self-Incrimination
Clause); see also Geyh, supra note 216, at 612 (noting defendants have been forced to
participate in line-ups); see McLennan, supra note 208, at 472 (noting that Wade Court
narrowed scope of Fifth Amendment based on testimonial aspects of the evidence).
219 See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (holding no Fifth
Amendment violation if defendant tries clothing on in court); see also Dennison, supra
note 208, at 750-53 (discussing non-testimonial evidence that is also not communicative in
nature was admitted into evidence by Court); McLennan, supra note 208, at 472 (noting
Supreme Court focused on testimonial aspects of evidence when deciding whether it was
protected by Self-Incrimination Clause).
220 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing
information Patane gave police after officers failed to administer Miranda warnings); see
Ambach, supra note 112, at 777-78 (noting defendant made statement that lead to
discovery of physical evidence); see also Leading Case, supra note 146, at 298-99 (noting
Self-Incrimination Clause protects compelled statements and will not extend to non-
testimonial evidence voluntarily given by defendant).
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of a non-coerced but unwarned statement to locate physical
evidence "differs only by a shade from the permitted use for that
purpose of his body or his blood."221 Thus:
Since the case lies between what the state clearly may
compel and what it clearly may not, a strong analytical
argument can be made for an intermediate rule whereby
although it cannot require the suspect to speak by
punishment or force, the non-testimonial fruits of speech
that is excludable only for failure to comply with the
Miranda code could still be used.222
This tenet quite properly resolves the seeming tension inherent
in the Fifth Amendment by excluding the unwarned statement
but allowing the admission of its non-testimonial "fruits," absent
actual coercion. 223
Some courts and commentators have posited the suggestion
that the non-application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine would inevitably encourage the police to engage in
unwarned interrogations in order to acquire derivative
evidence. 224 However, courts do not "sit as a kind of super-
Citizens' Police Review Board, creating some set of federal
common-law police regulations for local law enforcement officers
... by distinguishing, on a case-by-case basis, 'good' police
conduct from 'bad."'225 Instead, the appropriate function of the
judiciary in this circumstance is to "determine whether police
conduct has in some way rendered the admission of evidence at a
criminal trial violative of a defendant's constitutional rights."226
221 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 280 (1967).
222 Id.
223 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628-30 (2004) (holding that
exclusion of unwarned statement is a complete remedy to Miranda violations and "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply); see also Whitebread, supra note 148, at 123-
25 (discussing Patane and its holding that would exclude non-testimonial fruits of
Miranda violation); G. Paul McCormick, Supreme Court 2003-2004 Review - Part I, 28
CHAMPION 12, 16-17 (2004) (highlighting physical evidence seized due to Miranda
violation should be admitted into evidence).
224 See United States v. Orso, 275 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (Trott, J.,
dissenting) (stating Orso decision implies that police can violate the Constitution and still
have fruits of that violation admitted into evidence); see also Commonwealth v. Martin,
2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 433, at *5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 27 2004) (finding Patane
holding "troubling" and noting that it provides inducement to violate Miranda);
McCormick, supra note 223, at 17 (quoting Justice Souter who suggested that Patane
decision will give police incentive to ignore Miranda).
225 Orso, 275 F.3d at 1191 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
226 Id.
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Therefore, what might be thought improper is not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution.227 And indeed, the proper remedy
for a failure to administer Miranda warnings, as noted above, is
the suppression of the unwarned statement. 22 8
2. Deterrence Principles Do Not Mandate the Exclusion of
Derivative Physical Evidence
The Court has considered, in a number of cases, whether the
need to deter improper conduct necessitated the extension of
Miranda's exclusionary rule to derivative physical evidence. 229
Despite the fact that the court rejected the extension of the
Miranda exclusionary rule on the basis of a deterrence
rationale, 230 the Tenth Circuit primarily relied on a deterrence
rationale to justify an expansive reading of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine that allows for the suppression of
physical evidence derived from unwarned statements. 231 Yet,
deterrence offers no rationalization for suppression of the
physical evidence obtained in the Patane case.2 32
In Wong Sun, the Court indicated that evidence that is the
"fruit" of an illegal search or seizure under the Fourth
227 See id. (noting that not everything that is improper is unconstitutional). But see
Orso, 275 F.3d 1194-96 (Trott, J., dissenting) (noting that majority decision reduces police
incentive to follow Miranda). See generally Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629 n.3 (noting that
although some courts have suggested that Miranda is a constraint on police, Miranda's
decision states that it deals only with admissibility of evidence).
228 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629 (providing that exclusion is remedy for Miranda
violation); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 789-90 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "[t]he exclusion of unwarned
statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy). See
generally Withrow v. Williams, Jr., 507 U.S. 680, 703 (1993) (noting exclusion of
unwarned statements encourages police to institute procedural safeguards).
229 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (noting core rationale for
excluding derivative evidence is to deter police from improper conduct); cf. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (dealing with testimonial evidence); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (holding defendants statements taken in violation of Miranda
could be used to impeach him at trial); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1974)
(discussing deterrent effect of Miranda and testimonial evidence); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (allowing evidence to be used for impeachment purposes).
230 See cases cited supra note 229.
231 See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying on
deterrence theory); see also Ambach, supra note 112, at 778-79 (stating that Tenth
Circuit decision relied on deterrence theory); Leading Case, supra note 146, at 298(writing that Tenth Circuit did not wanting to eviscerate any deterrent effect).
232 See Angarella & Rutledge, supra note 137, at 180-81 (summarizing Patane
decision and stating that it does not support Tenth Circuit's reliance on deterrence
theory). See generally Thomas III, supra note 199, at 1995 n. 183 (stating that five justices
agreed that physical evidence is admissible in Patane); Hartman, supra note 62, at 284-
85 (noting prophylactic nature of Patane decision).
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Amendment must be suppressed.233 In Elstad, the Court refused
to utilize the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to bar the
admission of evidence that was the "fruit" of a Miranda
violation. 234 Moreover, the Court indicated that there is a
significant distinction between a coerced confession and a
statement in which "the breach of the Miranda procedures...
involved no actual compulsion."235 Thus, a Miranda violation
does not itself offend the Fifth Amendment prohibition barring
the use of "compelled" testimony.236 In contrast, the Tenth
Circuit indicated that Elstad "drew a distinction between fruits
consisting of a subsequent confession by the defendant after
having been fully Mirandized," which need not be suppressed,
and "fruits consisting of subsequently obtained 'inanimate
evidentiary objects,"' which the Tenth Circuit determined must
be suppressed, only to have this determination reversed by the
plurality decision in Patane.237 And while Elstad was concerned
with the possible suppression of a voluntary, warned statement
subsequent to a Miranda violation, Elstad's rationale is not
limited to only its facts. 238
In fact, Elstad roundly rejected the notion that the Wong Sun
doctrine applies to the "fruits" of a statement obtained without
Miranda warnings. 239 After noting Tucker's refusal to apply the
233 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (stating "this Court held
nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could not
constitute proof against the victim of the search").
234 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-09, 317-18 (asserting that "[n]o further purpose is served
by imputing 'taint' to subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and
knowing waiver").
235 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1995).
236 Id. at 306-07 n. 1 (noting Justice Stevens' puzzlement at the expressed statement);
see Judy Olivero, The Second Circuit Review - 1985-1986 Term: Criminal Procedure: The
Second Circuit Undermines the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: United States v.
Morales, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 443, 456 (1987) (stating that mere Miranda violation does not
necessarily indicate Fifth Amendment violation); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing
Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 267 (2000) (writing that unwarned statement does not
violate Fifth Amendment).
237 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct.
2620 (2004).
238 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 n.1 (noting that courts in Quarles and Tucker held
similarly); see also Ambach, supra note 112, at 776 (writing that Elstad language could be
broadly applied); William T. Pizzi, Criminal Law: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 579 n.91 (1985)
(stating that Elstad opinion is broadly worded and permits broad reading).
239 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-18 (holding traditional Fourth Amendment "fruits"
doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 441 (2000) (noting decision in Elstad refused to apply to traditional "fruits" doctrine
to Miranda violations); Donald Dripps, Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed
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"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the Elstad Court indicated
that Tucker's rationale applies "with equal force when the alleged
'fruit' of a non-coercive Miranda violation" is "a witness," "an
article of evidence," or "the accused's own voluntary
testimony."240 Moreover, Elstad explained that suppression was
unnecessary in all three contexts. 241 Indeed, it is not surprising
that the Court in Dickerson read Elstad as broadly "refusing to
apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth
Amendment cases," 2 42 because of Elstad's recognition that
"unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are
different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment."243 A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the
search occurs and "use of fruits of a past unlawful search or
seizure [works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."244 The "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine operates to deter these violations
at the extraordinary cost of barring the use of reliable evidence at
trial.245 However, and significantly, the Court has noted the
distinct purposes of both the Fourth Amendment and the
Miranda exclusionary rules.246 The police do not violate the Fifth
Amendment when they take an unwarned statement during a
custodial interrogation. 247 Rather, the Fifth Amendment requires
Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 19, 40-42 (2000) (stating Elstad
"rejects the analogy to Fourth Amendment fruits analysis in the context of successive
admissions").
240 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
241 United States v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308-18 (1995) (stating "there is no warrant
for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though
technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary").
242 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
243 Id.
244 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
245 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (discussing balancing
approach in Fourth Amendment exclusionary cases); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 486 (1976) (noting primary justification for exclusionary rule is deterrence of
unlawful police conduct); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating that
rule is only extended "to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served").
246 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (elucidating intent behind
Miranda and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rules); Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (1984)
(stating that "[tihe rule thus operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved"'); Stone, 428 U.S. at 482 (noting that
reason for creating Fourth Amendment was to cure evil associated with general warrants
and to protect sanctity of the person and home).
247 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-69 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (declaring that constitutional rights are not violated when
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only that the defendant be afforded the right at trial to exclude
the use of the unwarned statement from the government's case-
in-chief.248 Yet, Miranda does contain language that professes to
create general rules for the conduct of the police.249 And some of
the Court's subsequent cases include analogous descriptions of
Miranda procedures and note that an appraisal, of whether
distinct and particular applications of the Miranda exclusionary
rule would deter departures from those procedures, might be
appropriate. 250  However, the Court's formulation and
understanding of Miranda has developed and the underlying
purpose of the rule is clearly to protect against the possibility
that courts will admit a coerced confession, not to regulate police
conduct. 251
Therefore, as noted above, deterrence is not an underlying
purpose of the Miranda exclusionary rule and the police do not
engage in unconstitutional conduct by questioning a suspect
without the benefits of Miranda warnings. 252 Even if the
statements are taken in violation of Miranda); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (asserting that "[a]lthough conduct by law enforcement officials prior
to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial");
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (discussing how protection from the
use of improperly acquired information is only protection required to prevent
constitutional wrongs).
248 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-69 (noting that taking of a statement does not violate
constitutional guarantees); Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692 (describing Fifth Amendment as a
'trial right'). See generally Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974) (explaining
harm to judicial system that would occur if self incriminating statements were not
excluded from trial).
249 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (discussing warnings police
are required to make prior to eliciting information from an arrestee). See generally Yale
Kamisar, Willard Pedrick Lecture: Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the
Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 388 n.6 (2001)
(detailing situation that would occur if police officers were not bound to warn of Miranda
rights); Martin H. Sitler, The Armor: Recent Developments in Self-Incrimination Law,
2000 ARMY LAw. 47, 48 (2000) (explicating warnings police must give suspects upon
arrest).
250 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (explaining impositions of
Miranda); Michigan, 417 U.S. at 448 (clarifying evidentiary downfall of acquiring
statements in violation of Miranda). See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 434-43 (2000) (describing Miranda procedures in detail).
251 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-44 (explicating widespread acceptance of Miranda
as device to protect arrestee's rights to silence); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152
(1990) (noting that abiding by rules set forth in Miranda would provide an adequate
protective device against Fifth Amendment violations); see also Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-
69 (noting Miranda prevents admission of evidence at trial taken in violation of Miranda
but does not prevent the actual taking).
252 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-69 (defining the word 'case' as used in Fifth
Amendment); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (stating "[a]lthough conduct by law
enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional
violation occurs only at trial"); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (discussing how protection from
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deterrence of police failures to give Miranda warnings were the
basis of the Miranda exclusionary rule, this rule cannot properly
be extended to exclude derivative evidence. 253 Suppression of the
unwarned statement itself in the government's case-in-chief is a
more than sufficient deterrent.254 Patane demonstrates why a
greater deterrent response is inappropriate. The officer in Patane
began to give the defendant Miranda warnings, and was
interrupted by the defendant's assertion that he knew his
rights. 255 It is extraordinarily challenging to characterize the
officer's decision not to complete the Miranda warnings as such
blameworthy conduct as to mandate and indeed to justify the
suppression not only of the unwarned statements but also the
firearm that was found. 256 And where, as in Patane, the failure to
administer Miranda warnings was not an intentional
interrogation tactic to obtain incriminating evidence, a
deterrence rationale is particularly unconvincing. 257 However,
the Tenth Circuit indicated "the inability to offer [defendant's]
use of improperly acquired information is the only thing required to forego constitutional
wrongs).
253 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 319 n.2 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that dicta of Miranda should not be read as to foreclose use of derivative
evidence); Bateman, supra note 171, at 219 (noting Supreme Court's view that derivative
evidence is admissible). See generally David A. Wollin, Policing the 'Police: Should
Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 860 (1992) (articulating connection
to testimonial or communicative acts evidence must have in order to be excluded under
Fifth Amendment).
254 See Patrick Alexander, Note, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott:
Who Should Swallow the Bitter Pill of the Exclusionary Rule? The Supreme Court Passes
the Cup, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 69, 91 (1999) (observing Court's opinion that possibility of
suppression at trial sufficiently deters police and parole officers); David J. Lekich, Survey
of Developments in North Carolina Law and the Fourth Circuit, 1996: III. Criminal Law:
Broken Police Promises: Balancing the Due Process Clause Against the State's Right to
Prosecute, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2346, 2380 n.216 (1997) (discussing deterrent effects of
suppression). See generally North Carolina v. Sturgill, 469 S.E.2d 557, 568-69 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996) (canvassing how suppression adequately deters and how there is, likewise, no
need to dismiss the case in entirety).
255 See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1015 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating Patane
stopped the officer in mid recitation of Miranda rights), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
256 See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1029 (holding that gun seized due to Miranda violation
was inadmissible). See generally United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000)
(discussing bounds of Fifth Amendment protection with regard to exclusions of evidence);
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594 (1990) (addressing type of evidence excluded by
Fifth Amendment).
257 See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1015 (stating that police officer stopped in the middle of
Miranda rights at accused's request); see also Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good
Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule - A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 430-1 (1984)
(discussing 'good faith' exception to Fifth Amendment violations); cf. Robertson, supra
note 160, at 49 (explaining how there could be deterrent advantages to suppression of
evidence for negligent failures to warn).
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statements in this case affords no deterrence, because the ability
to offer the physical evidence (the gun) renders the statements
superfluous to conviction." 258 Yet, as the plurality indicated, the
Tenth Circuit was in error. 259
Physical evidence derived from unwarned statements must
still be connected to a defendant to have any significant
evidentiary value 260 and because such a connection may be
difficult or indeed impossible to establish absent a defendant's
statement, the suppression of an unwarned statement could
potentially bar prosecution in many cases despite the
admissibility of the derivative physical evidence. 26 1 For example,
suppression of a defendant's unwarned statement that indicates
ownership or the location of incriminating evidence may bar
prosecution in the not uncommon situation where the evidence is
found in a location to which others also have ready access.
Similarly, the suppression of a defendant's unwarned confession
to a murder that led to the location of the victim's body could
quite easily render a prosecution for murder impracticable,
despite the admissibility of the victim's body.2 62 Thus, the police
258 Patane, 304 F.3d, at 1026.
259 See Patane, 304 F.3d at 2629-30 (stating there is nothing to deter on behalf of
police for failure to warn via Miranda); see also Leading Case, supra note 146, at 298-300
(explaining Tenth Circuit's decision in Patane). See generally Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (noting lack of deterrence resulting from exclusion when police act in
good faith).
260 See generally New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (discussing problems
inherent in connecting person to prior statement); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (evidencing use of inadmissible statements to impeach defendant); Wollin, supra
note 253 (articulating connection to testimonial or communicative acts evidence must
have in order to be excluded under Fifth Amendment).
261 Cf. Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination
and the American Exclusionary Rule: A Societal Prohibitions Versus and Affirmative
Individual Right, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 222 (2002) (noting that court
has been willing to allow prosecutors at trial to use statements acquired in violation of
Miranda to impeach defendant). See generally Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and
Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 533, 550-56
(1999) (enumerating probative and reliable value of derivative evidence and
counterintuitive nature of its exclusion); Thomas III., supra note 199 (discussing various
instances where Miranda challenges were made, and percentage of cases where evidence
was admitted or suppressed).
262 See Commonwealth v. Learning, 247 A.2d 590, 593-94 (Pa. 1968) (finding that
evidence leading to victim's remains was inadmissible since obtained from unwarned
confession); cf. State v. Garrison, 519 P.2d 1295, 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (reversing
conviction of murder because video and audio recordings providing location of victim's
body were made after defendant's request for appointed attorney was denied). But see Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (allowing admittance of incriminating
statements by defendant because victim's body would have inevitably been discovered
notwithstanding defendant's confession).
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have a significant motivation to preserve the admissibility of a
defendant's statement and, therefore, to issue Miranda
warnings. 263 The Tenth Circuit significantly underestimated the
deterrent effect of suppressing a defendant's unwarned
statement. 26 4
3. Excluding Physical Evidence Does Not Aid the Reliability
Concerns of the Fifth Amendment
The suppression of physical evidence derived from unwarned
statements does not effectuate the rationale linked to the Fifth
Amendment's concern with reliability. The privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is founded, in part, on the
understanding that "coerced confessions are inherently
untrustworthy."265  Also, while coerced confessions are
suppressed regardless of a subsequent determination of truth,26 6
"it also seems clear that coerced statements have been regarded
with some mistrust" and there is a significant apprehension that
the "severe pressures" produced by particular interrogation
practices "may override a particular suspect's insistence on
innocence" and lead a defendant "to accuse himself falsely."26 7
However, by suppressing a significant group of statements in
which "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the
line between voluntary and involuntary statements," the
Miranda exclusionary rule thus "guard[s] against 'the use of
263 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (asserting that warnings
required are "prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant");
see, e.g., Learning, 247 A.2d at 595 (noting that an individual cannot waive right of which
he is unaware). But cf. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47 (finding that when an officer appeals to
defendant's decency to reveal location of victim's body absent counsel, suppression of such
evidence would burden the administration of criminal justice).
264 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629-30 (2004) (noting that Tenth
Circuit's position leads to strong deterrence-based argument for suppression of fruits); cf.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43 (noting that Court has justified expansion of exclusionary rule to
deter police from constitutional violations). See generally United States v. Faulkingham,
295 F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that trustworthiness and deterrence are rationales
behind Miranda).
265 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
266 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (asserting that confessions
that are product of physical or psychological coercion are inadmissible); see also La France
v. Bohlinger, III., 499 F.2d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1974) (recognizing that evidence induced by
coercion is unacceptable regardless of its truth or untruth); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 377 (1964) (noting that defendant is deprived of due process if he is convicted based
upon an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth).
267 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-49, n.23 (1970).
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unreliable statements at trial."' 268 Yet, where, as is the case in
Patane, physical evidence is at issue, the concern regarding
reliability has little to no substance. 269 Generally, physical
evidence, such as the firearm seized in Patane, is undoubtedly
"reliable" and "trustworthy" evidence. 270
There is thus good reason to impose a higher standard on the
police before allowing them to use a confession of murder
than a weapon bearing the confessor's fingerprints to which
his confession has led; doubtless this is the reason why fruits
of a confession "not blatantly coerced" are admitted in
England, India, and Ceylon, countries on whose experience
the Miranda opinion relied. 271
Consequently, the admissibility of such physical evidence at
trial does not implicate the Fifth Amendment's concern to protect
the truth-seeking process, while suppression of that physical
evidence would plainly undermine the search for the truth. 272
268 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435; see Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993)
(quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966)); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973) (noting that Miranda's decision was based upon
need to protect fairness of trial).
269 See United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1018 (8th Cir. 2003)
(suggesting that Tenth Circuit's decision in Patane is contrary to court's understanding of
inherent reliability of physical evidence); see also Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93 (finding
derivative physical evidence reliable). See generally Schonwald, supra note 7, at 1197
(noting that Villalba-Alvarado's decision concludes that reliability of physical evidence is
not diminished by an unwarned statement).
270 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (noting tangible evidence as
"inherently trustworthy"); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (stating that
"physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative
information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant"); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 458
(Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that element of unreliability is less important when
admissibility of "fruits" is at issue).
271 FRIENDLY, supra note 221, at 282; see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that "[t]he
learning of these countries was important to the development of the initial Miranda rule.
It therefore should be of equal importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda
exclusionary rule today"); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-89 (1966)
(examining foreign countries in an effort to develop code to regulate custodial
interrogatories).
272 See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that
Fifth Amendment "balances the value of the derivative evidence to the truth seeking
process against the protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, once the
defendant's own statements are suppressed"); see also State v. Yang, 608 NW.2d 703,
712-13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that derivative physical evidence obtained as a result
of an unwarned statement that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is not "tainted
fruit"). See generally James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1990) (explaining that "the
introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truth-
seeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence
would encourage police misconduct is but a 'speculative possibility"').
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Further, given the plurality's acceptance of the principles
above, it is beyond cavil that the application of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine within the context of intentional
Miranda violations, as was the case in United States v.
Faulkingham, is also without merit. Requiring courts to
determine whether there has been a negligent or intentional
Miranda violation would undermine the clarity of the bright-line
rule that Miranda was designed to be and would place a difficult
as well as an unnecessary burden on the courts. 273
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Patane, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit erred on the side of excess by applying the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine so as to exclude physical
evidence derived from statements acquired through a negligent
violation of the defendant's Miranda rights. 274 In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit utilized the Court's holding in Dickerson, which
merely indicated that Miranda was a constitutional rule 27 5 that
could not be superseded by legislation.276 This use of the
Dickerson decision was not only unintended by the Court but it
runs contrary to the development of both Miranda and the "fruit
273 See Ambach, supra note 112, at 792 (noting that First Circuit's focus on
intentional violations clouds Miranda's bright-line rule). See generally Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 473-74 (clarifying Miranda procedure); United States v. Gilmore, 03-CR-0030-C-01,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4912, at *7 (W.D. Wis. March 16, 2004) (recognizing advantages of
Miranda's bright line rule).
274 See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1015, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that rule limiting "suppression of the physical fruits of a Miranda violation to
situations where the police demonstrably acted in intentional bad faith would fail to
vindicate the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose"), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2630 (2004);
see also Abraham v. Kansas, 67 Fed. Appx. 529, 532 (10th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging and
applying Tenth Circuit's decision). But see Gilmore, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4912, at *14-
18 (criticizing Tenth Circuit's decision).
275 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004) (noting decision in
Dickerson which classified Miranda as constitutional decision); Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 444 (2000) (asserting that Miranda laid out constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement officials and courts to follow); see also Bilbrew v. Garvin,
97-CV-1422 (JG), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 622, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2001) (explaining
that constitutionality of Miranda safeguards was made clear by Court in Dickerson).
276 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435, 444 (concluding that "Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively"); see also Renda v.
King, 347 F.3d 550, 557-58 (3rd Cir. 2003) (reiterating that Congress may not pass
statute that lessens Miranda's procedural protections); United States v. Newton, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 157, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that Dickerson decision did not destroy Elstad).
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of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 277 Moreover, there is no sufficient
policy justification that would serve to validate the suppression
of physical evidence derived from an unwarned statement. 278
Thus, this Comment supports the plurality opinion by which the
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Patane
and indicated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
should not be applied so as to exclude evidence acquired through
an unwarned statement. However, this Comment yet maintains
that the non-application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
should be logically extended to encompass not only negligent but
intentional failures to administer Miranda warnings.
277 See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 94 (emphasizing that constitutional violations
trigger concerns of fruits doctrine); see also United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218
(4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Dickerson did not alter its refusal to extend "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to physical evidence discovered because of unwarned
statements); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3rd Cir. 2001) (holding that
"the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to derivative evidence secured as a
result of a voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings are issued").
278 See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that
Court has discouraged use of "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine following Miranda
violation, whatever the nature of derivative evidence); see also Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219
(stating that "derivative evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement that was
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is never 'fruit of the poisonous tree'); DeSumma,
272 F.3d at 180-81 (finding that defendant's seized gun was admissible even though it
was secured because of his non-Mirandized statement).

